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THAT TRUTH EXISTS IS MORE LOGICAL
Noriaki Iwasa
Postmodernists claim that there is no truth. However, the
statement ‘there is no truth’ is self-contradictory. This essay
shows the following: One cannot state the idea ‘there is no
truth’ universally without creating a paradox. In contrast, the
statement ‘there is truth’ does not produce such a paradox.
Therefore, it is more logical that truth exists.
Bonaventure, a medieval scholastic theologian and philo-
sopher, formulates a paradox used by Augustine as
follows: ‘If there is no truth, then it is true to say: “There is
no truth.” But if this is true, then something is true. And if
something is true, there is a first truth.’1 On the other hand,
if the statement ‘there is no truth’ is false, then there is
truth. In either event, the statement ‘there is no truth’ is
self-contradictory. Philosophers call this paradox a ‘reflexive
paradox,’ ‘self-referential paradox,’ or ‘performative self-con-
tradiction (contradiction between what one says and what
saying it implies or intends).’
One might claim that ‘the only truth is that there is no
truth.’ Let us call the entire statement in the single quota-
tion marks (1). According to (1), the only truth is the follow-
ing: ‘there is no truth.’ However, (1) itself intends to be true.
Thus, there is at least one more truth other than the claim
‘there is no truth.’ Therefore, (1) is self-contradictory. Also,
the claim ‘there is no truth’ contradicts the truth of (1) itself.
Besides, since ‘there is no truth,’ there is no room for ‘the
only truth’ from the beginning. In these senses too, (1) is
self-contradictory.
Let us think about the claim ‘the only truth is x’ in
general. Let us call the entire statement in the single quota-
tion marks (a). Now, (a) itself intends to be true. This con-
tradicts what (a) says unless x is (a) itself. Even if one
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claims that ‘the only truth is (a)’ in order to admit the truth
of (a) itself, the same paradox appears. This attempt to
avoid the paradox leads to infinite regress, and cannot
avoid it forever.
One might try to express the truth of a statement itself in
the statement. For example, ‘the only truth is this statement
in the single quotation marks.’ Let us call the entire state-
ment in the single quotation marks (2). Surely (2) avoids
the paradox as in (1) and (a). Yet (2) simply admits the
existence of truth.
Then one might try to combine (1) and (2) so that he
can express the truths of the claim ‘there is no truth’ and
of a statement itself which includes the claim at the same
time. For example, ‘the only truths are the claim “there is
no truth” and this statement in the single quotation marks.’
Let us call the entire statement in the single quotation
marks (3). According to (3), there are two truths: the
claim ‘there is no truth’ and (3) itself. However, the claim
‘there is no truth’ contradicts the truth of (3) itself. Besides,
since ‘there is no truth,’ there is no room for ‘the only
truths’ from the beginning. Therefore, (3) is self-
contradictory.
Let us return to the statement ‘there is no truth.’ One
might claim that the statement is not self-contradictory
because it is a statement at a meta-level. This simply
admits the existence of truth at the meta-level. However,
one cannot claim that ‘there is no truth’ universally without
creating a paradox. Hilary Lawson writes,
In the case of a statement such as ‘There is no
truth’, a paradox arises as soon as the self-referen-
tial character of the claim is recognized. If there is
no truth, then it cannot be a truth that there is no
truth. Thus if this claim is to be maintained a distinc-
tion has to be introduced so that ‘There is no truth’
refers to a limited region of statements, allowing
the statement itself to be asserted as a truth. So
long as the statement can belong to a higher order,
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a meta-level, the self-reference can be avoided and
the paradox evaporates.
This form of reflexive problem is less easily dis-
patched when the introduction of another level itself
generates a further paradox. Suppose we wish to
say of sentences at the meta-level that ‘There is no
truth.’ To avoid paradox we would have to resort to a
meta-meta-level. This would successfully avoid the
paradox in this instance, but if we wish to claim that
‘There is no truth’ generally, we are left with an
endless hierarchy of meta-levels.2
Lawson also says, ‘an endless hierarchy of levels might
enable us to avoid paradox on any particular occasion but
in the end there must be a level at which the claim “There
is no truth” no longer applies.’3
One might make the following claim at a meta-level:
‘there is no truth below the meta-level.’ This claim simply
admits the existence of truth at the meta-level and higher
meta-levels. Suppose the claim is true. Then there are
an infinite number of truths at the meta-level. For example,
it is a truth that ‘there is no truth below the meta-level.’
And it is a truth that ‘it is a truth that there is no truth below
the meta-level,’ and so forth indefinitely. However, when
there are an infinite number of truths at the meta-level,
what is the point of establishing the meta-level in the first
place?
Empirically speaking, the claim ‘there is no truth below
the meta-level’ is wrong. Let us think about the following
Cartesian example: the existence of consciousness which
understands this claim. Is not the existence of the con-
sciousness true? If not, how could one understand the
claim in the first place?
Thus, one cannot state the idea ‘there is no truth’ univer-
sally without creating a paradox. No one can refute this
conclusion without committing a performative self-contradic-
tion because any attempt to refute it intends to be true. If
not, why do we have to care about it? In contrast, the
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statement ‘there is truth’ does not produce such a paradox.
Therefore, it is more logical that truth exists.
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